















This paper uses an exclusive proprietary data set of European Credit Derivatives and 
VIX markets, covering a sample of 5 to 7 years, to study the nature of the theoretical 
link between credit risk and market risk, originally postulated in the work of Merton.  
This allows us to establish cointegration in the VIX and iTraxx/CDS markets in a 
demand and supply framework where arbitrageurs exploit temporary equilibrium 
mispricing following pairs strategies.  By shorting the outperformer and buying the 
underperformer asset, arbitrageurs achieve equilibrium price convergence. Profits from 
pairs strategies, represented via VECM parameters, guarantee positive expected profits.  
Empirical estimates suggest that temporary mispricing exists due to a lead of VIX in the 
discovery process.   We contribute to the existent literature suggesting that VIX as an 
improved predictor of CDS spreads.  
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1.  Introduction 
The relation between credit spreads and equity implied volatility has been widely 
studied in the finance literature. In his seminal work, Merton (1974) modelled firm 
default probabilities as a function of stock market related variables. More recently, 
Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo Helfenberger (2009) looked at the effect of equity 
historical volatility on credit spreads. Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) analysed CDS and 
realized volatility while, Cao, Yu and Zhaodong (2010) focused on the relationship 
between CDS spreads and option implied volatilities. The main conclusion of these 
studies is that volatility increases the probability of default and therefore the spreads.  
A related strand of literature has recognized the important role of the VIX index in 
determining credit spreads (see for example Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin 
2001, Schaefer and Strebulaev 2008, among others). VIX has also been acknowledged 
as an important determinant of credit risk premium from sovereign CDS spreads (Pan 
and Singleton 2008).  VIX is in this context a widely watched measure of event risk in 
credit markets.  
 
In response to this literature, we use an exclusive European credit derivative data set to 
provide the first analysis that considers credit risk and the VIX index in a cointegration 
framework.  For a broad sample of 47 individual company iTraxx /CDSs covering a 5 to 
7 years, we propose a no-arbitrage relation between European CDSs and the VIX 
volatility index in an equilibrium demand and supply framework with a common non 
stationary factor. Our work focuses on the adjustment of two cointegrated series to any 
event that causes divergences (between VIX and iTraxx/ CDS) from the equilibrium 
relationship driven by arbitrage between two markets. Within this framework we find 
short lived deviations from long term equilibrium between market risk and credit risk 
and a lead of VIX over CDS in the price discovery process.  
Credit risk can be defined as the risk of loss resulting from failures of counterparties or 
borrowers to fulfil their obligations. Credit risk appears in almost all financial activities, 
so it is important to measure, price and manage it precisely. Credit risk is hedged via 
credit derivatives, which are financial contracts that transfer the (credit) risk and return 3 
 
of an underlying asset from one counterparty to another without actually transferring the 
underlying asset.  
The value of any credit derivative is linked to the probability of the underlying reference 
entity being exposed to a credit risk event (bankruptcy, delayed payment, restructuring, 
etc) at some point in the future. The most important credit derivative market is the credit 
default swaps (CDS) market, which makes about half the total credit derivatives trading 
volume. A credit default swap is essentially an insurance contract providing protection 
against losses arising from a credit event. Credit derivatives and CDS came into 
existence in 1992 and has been growing exponentially during the past decade, reaching 
$62 trillion in notional amount outstanding by the end of 2007. 
 Large exposures to a diversified pool of credit risk are now much easier to gain thanks 
to the high liquidity of the iTraxx market. The iTraxx index is a portfolio of the 125 
most liquid CDS of European Investment Grade rated companies in the market. It is the 
main reference European credit Index that measures the recently exacerbated risk of 
default in Eurozone banks. The increased liquidity of the iTraxx market has attracted 
new participants such as hedge funds and capital structure arbitrageurs.
 1 
In this paper we choose CDS spreads as a direct measure of credit risk because it has 
several advantages over bond spreads. First, as noted by Zhang Zhou and Zhu (2009), 
CDS spreads provide relatively pure pricing of default risk and are typically traded on 
standardized basis. Second, bond spreads are usually more affected by differences in 
contractual arrangements, such as differences related to seniority, embedded options and 
coupon rates. Third, as was as shown by Blanco Brennan and March (2005) the absence 
of funding and short-sale restrictions in the derivatives market, allows the CDS market 
to adjust faster to changes in credit risk conditions than the corporate bond market.  
 
The importance of understanding the underlying causes of credit risk is evident in the 
current period, where the iTraxx CDS index has leapt above levels not seen since the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. While the iTraxx index reached a record since the 
measure was launched in 2004, the VIX index, often described as Wall Street “fear 
gauge” neared its 29 month high struck. In fact, the VIX index has been above 30 over 
                                                            
1 In June 21 2004 the two main CDS indexes iBoxx and Trac-x, were merged into the Dow Jones iTraxx 
index that since has set a new standard when it comes to liquidity transparency and diversification. 4 
 
three months, making this the longest continuous period it has stayed above that 
threshold for more than two years.  
 
In this paper, we study the nature of the relationship between VIX and iTraxx/CDS 
markets by proposing pairs trading strategies in cointegrated markets. The CBOE 
implied volatility index VIX, current factor benchmark for stock market volatility, 
measures a weighted average of option prices on the S&P 500 index across all strikes at 
two nearby maturities. On March 2004 the CBOE launched the Chicago futures 
exchange to start trading futures in the new VIX. Options on the VIX started in 2006. 
They have been the most successful contract in the history of the exchange.  As a result, 
VIX is now the premier benchmark for world stock market risk.  
 
Exploring deeper into the information content of the VIX index, we address the 
following question: can we capitalize on our cointegration and price discovery results to 
make arbitrage profits? To answer this question, we focus on “pairs trading” strategies. 
These are Wall Street investment strategies that belong to the proprietary “statistical 
arbitrage” tools currently implemented by investment banks and hedge funds. Forming 
pairs of VIX with firm level and portfolio CDS, we find that profits from pairs 
strategies outperform profits from investing in VIX or iTraxx /CDSs alone.  
Our paper contributes to the existent literature in a number of ways. We reconsider the 
underlying relationship between credit risk and volatility originally postulated by 
Merton (1974) and model it in a price discovery framework establishing cointegration 
in the two related markets.  Several credit risk price discovery studies have focused 
exclusively on information from just a single or at most two financial markets. 
Longstaff, Mithal and Neiss (2003) studied a sample of US bonds and found that 
information in equity markets leads information in debt markets. Blanco, Brennnan and 
Marsh (2005) analysed a set of European and US bonds using CDS prices and credit 
spreads in the bond cash market and found that the CDS market is the leader in the price 
discovery process. We contribute to the credit risk price discovery literature by focusing 
on the CDS and VIX markets and showing that VIX is leading in the price discovery 
process. This allows recognition of the important role of volatility in the determination 
of credit risk as envisaged in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstain and Martin (2001) among 5 
 
others. We also advance in the cointegration and price discovery literature  by proposing 
pairs strategies between CDS and VIX markets whose profits are explained in a VECM 
framework.  
Cointegration is important because, as shown in Engle and Granger (1987), the presence 
of common stochastic trends require VECM representations. These models show that 
current period price changes depend on how far the system was out of long-run 
equilibrium last period. While a large strand of literature empirically analyses the 
existence of cointegration in financial assets, comparatively little has been done to 
examine the theoretical reasons for cointegration in financial markets (see Brener and 
Kroner 1995 and references therein). Notable exceptions include Campbell and Shiller 
(1987) and Bossaerts (1988). Brenner and Kroner (1995) use only widely accepted no-
arbitrage arguments to explain why some markets, such as currency spot and forward  
markets are cointegrated, while other markets, such as commodity spot and forward 
(futures) markets, are not cointegrated. A more recent example includes the work by 
Figuerola-Gonzalo (2010), (FG hereafter) which introduces an equilibrium framework 
that leads to an economically meaningful interpretation of the VECM model. While FG 
base their model on the existence of arbitrage between spot and future commodity 
prices, our work describes arbitrage strategies between VIX and CDS markets on the 
basis of pairs trading the two related assets. Profits from pairs strategies exist only when 
deviations are short lived but equilibrium adjustment is not immediate, in which case 
VIX and CDS dynamics are represented via a VECM. This framework allows us to 
build pairs strategies that offer improved performance than investing on VIX or credit 
spreads alone. 
By testing cointegration and the existence of abnormal returns we shed light to 
empirical literature on price efficiency. Brennan and Wang (2010) integrate the 
empirical price efficiency and the asset pricing literature by showing that expected rates 
of return depend on fundamental risk as well as asset mispricing.  Our work relates to 
this literature in that it decomposes observed prices of cointegrated series into a 
common fundamental value and a transitory component. We are interested in arbitrage 
strategies that exploit temporary misspricing in related assets. Relative pricing means 
that two securities that are close substitutes for each other should sell for the same price.  
The law of one price (see Ingersoll 1987 and Chen and Knez 1995) can be applied to 6 
 
relative pricing. This is potentially useful to researchers because, despite considerable 
theory about market efficiency, economists have little empirical information of how 
efficiency is maintained in practice. In this paper we shed light to the empirical 
literature on price efficiency propose pairs trading strategies built upon the existence of 
temporary mispricing.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we establish the theoretical 
link between VIX and the CDS market which is fully developed in appendix A.0. 
Section 3 relates the VECM to the construction of pairs trading strategies. This requires 
a description of preliminaries and main result of the FG model applied to credit risk and 
market risk (detailed exposition of the model is presented in Appendix A.1). Data and 
empirical results on cointegration and price discovery are presented in section 4. In 
section 5 we show results from “pairs trading” strategies. Section 6 concludes. Graphs 
and additional tables are collected in appendix A.2. 
2.  Theoretical link between VIX and the CDS market 
The theoretical relationship between credit risk and stock market related variables dates 
back to Merton (1974). In his model, firm´s liabilities (equity and debt) are assumed to 
be contingent claims issued against a firm underlying asset. The default probability in 
the Merton (1974) model is a nonlinear function of the firm´s stock price, stock price 
volatility and the leverage ratio. Given this framework, the VIX is a proxy of equity 
volatility which is directly associated with the volatility of assets. For a detailed 
explanation see appendix A0. 
3.  VECM Dynamics, Price Discovery and Pairs Strategies 
The goal of this section is to characterize the dynamics of VIX and iTraxx/CDS in an 
equilibrium framework based on the existence of pairs strategies. We focus on the 
adjustment of VIX and CDS prices when there is temporary misspricing. The 
participants in the VIX markets are those individuals who invest directly the index or 
that trade derivatives on the VIX index. Participants in the CDS markets take positions 
on the (iTraxx) index or on individual CDSs. Knowledge about the characteristics of the 
joint dynamics between VIX derivatives and CDS index markets is crucial to 
arbitrageurs which, will exploit (short lived) deviations from equilibrium in search for 7 
 
benefit from pairs strategies.  In this section we provide a framework that describes their 
reduced-equilibrium dynamics. 
Let xt be the price of a credit derivative or a credit derivative index in time t.  Let vt be 
the contemporaneous price of VIX forward looking volatility index.
2 In order to find the 
non-arbitrage equilibrium condition the following set of standard assumptions apply in 
this section: 
•  (a.1) No limitations on borrowing. 
•  (a.2) No cost other than arbitrage transaction cost. 
•  (a.3) No limitations on short sale. 
•  (a.4) Transaction cost between credit derivatives and the VIX derivatives 
markets is determined by the stationary process zt.
 3 Transaction costs consist of 
commissions involved in opening and closing positions in the CDS and the VIX 
portfolio. 
•  (a.5) Credit derivatives and VIX derivative prices are I(1), implying that its 
mean and auto covariances are different for every realization of t. 
 
By the above assumptions (a.1-a.5), non-arbitrage equilibrium conditions imply: 
  01 tt t x vz γ γ = ++ (1) 
where γ0 is the (constant) cash amount required to buy γ1 units of VIX to replicate the 
CDS portfolio. Therefore γ1 reflects the size of the position that has to be taken in the 
VIX portfolio to replicate returns in the CDS market.  
Equation 1, implies that xt and vt are cointegrated. The arbitrage relationship specified in 
(1) shows how credit derivatives and credit derivative portfolios can be replicated with 
positions in the VIX derivative market. zt reflects  transaction costs, incurred in pursuing 
pairs strategies in both markets or any other related factors or imperfections that 
generate a random difference in the VIX and CDS spreads levels.  
                                                            
2 For how to invest on VIX spot please see as an example Investable Volatility Index by Merril Lynch. 
3 See Brennan and Schwartz (1990) for an exposition of optimal arbitrage strategies with transaction costs 
and position limits. 8 
 
As was shown in section 2, credit risk and the VIX index are expected to be linked via 
financial theory. To study the nature of this link, we adapt the FG theoretical model to 
focus on how pair strategists restore temporary mispricing in both markets.  In what 
follows we propose that because xt and vt are linked and cointegrated, price convergence 
is achieved via “pairs trading strategies.” The idea is that when the spread between both 
prices widens, so that there is positive profit potential, an arbitrageur will short the 
winner and buy the loser. If the long and short components measure a common non 
stationary factor, then the prices of the component portfolios are cointegrated and pairs 
trading strategies are expected to provide positive profits. 
When convergence to long run equilibrium is almost immediate, there is very limited 
opportunity to profit from pairs strategies. This happens when there is an infinite 
elasticity of demand for pursuing pairs strategies (H).
4 In this case, there is an 
immediate price adjustment to divergences between the CDS and the replicating VIX 
portfolio. As a consequence, potential profits represented by and zt in equation (1) are 
zero. However, there are a number of cases in which the elasticity of demand for pairs 
strategies is not infinite in the real world.  Many factors, mainly arising from transaction 
costs, significant position limits, differential tax treatment in the CDS and VIX markets, 
restrictions in the short run availability of capital, may limit the supply of arbitrage 
services for pursuing pairs strategies, by making arbitrage transactions between both 
markets risky (which implies H>0 and zt ് 0). This complicates the dynamics between 
market risk and credit risk. 
The model developed in appendix A.1 describes the interaction between agents that 
trade in the credit derivatives and VIX market, when there is finite elasticity of demand 
for pursuing pairs strategies.  Under this more realistic case, the dynamics between the 
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with    
                                                            
4 This requires H→∞ in equation (2). The elasticity measures in this context the proportional change in 
deand for “pairs strategies” for a given change in the quantity of arbitrage services. 9 
 
  ( ) 1 x vx dH N N H N γ =+ +  (3) 
Where there are Nx participants in the credit derivatives market and Nv participants in 
VIX market and, as previously specified, the elasticity of demand for pursuing pairs 
strategies is noted by H. 

















Δ= = + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ Δ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠  (4) 
with   01 tt t zx v γ γ =−−  and  ut a vector white noise with i.i.d shocks. 
In order for the VECM to be well defined and “pairs strategies” between VIX and 
iTraxx/CDS to work, the following conditions should be satisfied: 
I.  If α1 and α2 are both statistically significant, they must have opposite signs, as 
predicted by the theoretical result in (2). This implies that, if there is a change in 
the equilibrium error, so that for instance xt is greater than its replicating VIX 
portfolio (zt>0), then xt is expected to fall in the next period while vt should 
increase in order to restore equilibrium. In this case α1 will be negative and α2 
positive, so pairs strategists will short the CDS (outperformer) and buy VIX 
(underperformer) to exploit price divergences. This allows positive profits until 
temporary mispricing disappears.  
II.  If zt>0 and the CDS market were contributing significantly to price discovery, α2 
will be positive and statistically significant as the VIX market adjusts to 
incorporate new information. Similarly, if the VIX market is an important venue 
for price discovery then α1 would be negative and statistically significant. If both 
coefficients are significant then both markets contribute to price discovery. The 
existence of cointegration means that at least one market has to restore long run 
equilibrium, implying that the given market is short term inefficient, so that 
profits from pairs strategies can be achieved. If the adjustment of both prices is 
immediate and independent of the cointegrating error (α1=α2=0), the elasticity of 
                                                            
5 Note that in the empirical part lags of  ΔY are chosen in order to obtain white noise errors. 10 
 
demand for pairs strategies is infinite (H→∞), and there is no VECM, no price 
discovery, and no profit from “pairs strategies.”  
III.  In the VECM framework, VIX and CDS markets are modelled to converge to each 
other to restore equilibrium. The coefficients α1 and α2 are the adjustment 
coefficients, and measure the speed by which VIX and CDS spreads adjust to long 
run equilibrim. This is slow when the parameter is close to 0, and fast when it is 
close to 1. In the case where α1#0 and α2=0, the VIX market does not adjust to the 
CDS market as it is essentially the common factor or efficient price. 
The Analysis of price discovery lies on a decomposition of cointegrated prices into a 
common permanent factor and a transitory component.
6 As proposed in FG, in this 
framework, the permanent component or common factor (CFt) is a linear combination 
of xt and vt weighted by their corresponding price discovery metrics, 
  tx t v t CF PD x PD v = +  (5) 
It can be shown from VECM in (2) and (3), that the contribution to price discovery in 
the CDS and VIX markets are:




























−+  (7) 
So price discovery depends on the relative number of players in the VIX and CDS 
market. If new information from both markets is incorporated into the common factor,  
0≤ PDi ≤1 for i= x, v.  If PDx=1 and PDv=0 then there is a predominance
8 of credit risk 
market in the price discovery process. If PDx=0 and PDv=1 there is predominance of 
the VIX market in the price discovery process. 
                                                            
6 The two popular Price discovery metrics are the Information Shares of Hasbrouck (1995) and the 
Permanent Transitory Decomposition of Gonzalo Granger (1995).( See also Lehman 2002 special issue in 
the Journal of Financial Markets). 
7 See Booth et al. (2002) and Blanco et al. (2005) for an equivalent representation of the price discovery 
parameters. 11 
 
In order to describe profits from pairs strategies we define the cointegration error as:   
01 tt t zx v γ γ =−−    
If zt-1 >0, so that  the CDS on the previous period was above its equilibrium level, an 
investor should short the CDS and long VIX in order to profit from pairs strategies. 
Profits from this strategy may be defined as:            
  
  1 () tt tt M xv M z γ Π= − Δ + Δ = − Δ  (8) 
Where xt is measured in basis points, vt is measured in volatility points, and M is the 





















 When zt-1 > 0, for the VECM to work α1 must negative (-Nv) and α2 positive (Nx ) as 
indicated in our theoretical framework (2). This guarantees that expected profits from 
pairs strategies are always positive. We test this proposition empirically in section 5. 
4.  Cointegration and Price Discovery 
We have daily data for the VIX and 3 year, 5 year and 10 year maturity iTraxx indexes 
for the period dating from June 2004 to the 8
th of December of 2009. The data source is 
Bloomberg for VIX and Markit for iTraxx. The Markit iTraxx Europe Index is 
composed of 125 investment grade entities from 6 sectors: Autos, Consumers, Energy, 
Financials, Industrials, and TMT. The composition of each Markit iTraxx index is 
determined by the International Index Company according to the Index Rules. Markit 
iTraxx indices roll every 6 months in March and September. New series of iTraxx have 
been realized every six months since its introduction. Over our sample period there have 
been 11 different series of the iTraxx index. We use information in each of these series 
to select the 50 most representative iTraxx companies.
9 These are those for which CDS 
                                                                                                                                                                              
8 Predominance in this context implies that the common factor is driven solely from the dominant price 
9 Markit failed to provide data on CDS in 3 out of the 50 selected, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Union 
Fenosa, and CIE Fin Michelin. Therefore the analysis involves 47 companies. 12 
 
have been traded in all 11 iTraxx series. Data for individual CDS is available from July 
2002 for 3, 5, and 10 year maturities.. These are measured in basis points.
 10 Therefore 
we use a sample dating from July 2002 to December 2009 when looking at VIX and 
individual CDS. Figures 1-3 show the time series plot of both iTraxx, VIX and France 
Telecom CDS for the three maturities over the 2004-2009 period. While VIX is 
measured in volatility points the iTraxx measure is in index points. The three figures 
suggest that VIX, iTraxx, as well as individual company CDS they are highly related for 
all maturities. In particular, their value increased by 400% over the period ranging from 
early 2007 to mid-2008 signalling the degree of global fear in the economy.  
In what it follows, we show that VIX and iTraxx as well as VIX and individual CDSs 
are cointegrated via arbitrage relationships in the form of pairs trading strategies. This 
requires investment positions in the VIX and CDS markets. Exposures on the iTraxx 
market can be gained via a new credit derivative ETF on the NYSE Euronext market in 
Paris the EasyETF iTraxx. This includes EasyEFT iTraxx Europe HiVol, EasyETF 
iTraxx Crossover, and the new tracker on the European credit derivative market, the 
EasyETF iTraxx Europe Main.
11 The objective of these ETFs is to replicate as closely 
as possible the performance of the iTraxx index. They are all managed through synthetic 
replication. 
12 
Positions on VIX can be gained either directly through the investable volatility index or 
via positions on VIX derivatives. Futures on VIX provide a pure play on implied 
volatility independent of the direction and level of stock prices. VIX futures may also 
provide an effective way to hedge equity returns, to diversify portfolios, and to spread 
implied against realized volatility. Exposure to VIX futures is possible through ETFs 
such as ETF Spotlight on iPath S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures ETN. The funds seek 
to replicate the S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Total Return and the S&P 500 VIX 
Mid-Term Futures Total Return indexes. 
The VIX options contract is the first product on market volatility to be listed on an 
SEC-regulated securities exchange. This new product, which can be traded from an 
options-approved securities account, follows the introduction of VIX Futures on the 
                                                            
10 Each basis point in CDS represents €1000 to protect €10m of debt. 
11 EasyETFiTraxxCrossover and EasyETFiTraxxHiVol also trade in the Deutche Borse. 
12 More information on EasyETFs on iTraxx can be found in ( www.easyetf.com). 13 
 
CBOE Futures Exchange (CFE). Many investors consider the VIX Index to be the 
world's premier barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility, and VIX options 
are very powerful risk management tools.   
The Investable Volatility Index allows market players to take a position on the spot 
rather than the derivatives volatility market.  The index is built up from VIX-like 
components computed from the four major quarterly S&P500 option expirations (Mar, 
Jun, Sep, Dec). It is designed to measure the return of an investment in the forward 
implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index. The index, created by Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch and calculated by CBOE is designed to offer direct exposure to equity market 
volatility. 
Because we analyse the VIX index and not VIX derivatives, our empirical part refers to 
positions taken directly on index. Our empirical analysis is based on the VECM 
specified in equation (3). Econometric details of the estimation and inference of (3) can 
be found in Johansen (1996), and Juselius (2006). We report in the main text 
cointegration and price discovery results for VIX and and iTraxx as well as VIX and 
individual CDS, for 5 year maturities.  Results are presented in Tables I-II. 
Cointegration and price discovery results for 3 year and 10 year maturities are reported 
in tables Ia to IVa in the appendix.  
The first step is to perform a unit root test. Unit roots are a necessary condition for 
cointegration. Practitioners and theoreticians often refer to VIX and other volatility 
measures as being “mean reverting,” which is a statistical way of saying that at 
historically low VIX levels there is a high probability that the next big move will be up 
rather than down. Conversely, at historically high VIX levels, the next move is likely to 
be down rather than up. However VIX is an implied volatility index, meaning that it is a 
reflection of option price quotations. In fact, VIX is calculated directly from the price 
quotations of nearby and second nearby S&P 500 index options spanning a wide range 
of strike prices. The VIX calculation is independent of any theoretical pricing model, 
using a formula that averages the weighted prices of at-the-money and out-of-the money 
puts and calls to derive expected volatility.
 13 The statistical properties of the VIX index 
                                                            
13 More information and a sample calculation may be found at http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/ 
vixwhite.pdf. 14 
 
will therefore be determined by the distribution of weighted average option prices.  In 
this paper we determine whether VIX is mean reverting empirically. 
We apply the Augmented Dickey Fuller test to all series in our sample.  Neither VIX, 
iTraxx  nor individual CDS, exhibit mean reversion over our sample period.
14 Results 
are robust to the iTraxx/CDS maturity chosen.
15  
Before testing the rank of cointegration in the VECM specified in (3) two decisions are 
to be taken: i) selecting the number of lags of (Δxt Δvt )  necessary to obtain white noise 
errors, and ii) deciding how to model the deterministic elements in the VECM. For the 
former, we use the information criterion, AIC, and for the latter, following our 
theoretical model, we restrict the constant term to be inside the cointegrating 
relationship.  
 We report Johansen cointegration test results for VIX and iTraxx as well as VIX and 
each reference entity CDS with 5 year maturities are presented in Table I. Critical 
values are taken from Juselius (2006). As predicted by our model, we find evidence of 
cointegration between xt and vt, which implies that VIX and 5 year iTraxx are linked via 
a long term arbitrage relationship under the imposed restriction that the error term (zt) is 
stationary. The (constant) cash amount γ0 required to replicate the iTraxx portfolio is 
negative (reported with a positive sign in the table), suggesting that γ0 units of cash are 
shorted to replicate 5 year iTraxx (in basis points) with γ1 units of the VIX portfolio (in 
volatility points). This is also the case for all but six of the cointegrated individual 5 
year CDS. 
16 
We find cointegration at the 5% level between for VIX and each reference entity CDS 
for 42 out of the 47 companies considered. The remaining 5 show cointegration at the 
10% significance level.
 17 Conflicting signs in VECM estimates for Eurpn Aero 
Defence, Metro AG, and Repsol YPF SA confirms 39 out of the 42 cases of 
cointegration at 5% significance level.
18  
                                                            
14 The null hypothesis of unit root fails to be rejected for VIX and 5 year  iTraxx at the 5% significance 
level ( with p values equal to 0.277  and 0.478 respectively). 
15 Results are available upon request.   
16 Out of the 6 positive signs in the table, 4 are not significant.  
17 Note that the p value for the trace statistic for no cointegration is 5.2% and we take it as significant at 
the 5% level. 
18 Conflicting signs imply that estimates of adjustment vector coefficients (α1 and α2) are equal signaling 
evidence of no cointegration . 15 
 
We report Johansen cointegration test results for VIX and iTraxx for 3 and 10 year 
maturities in Tables Ia and IIIa in the appendix. We find evidence of cointegration  
between VIX and iTraxx for 3 and 10 year maturities, suggesting that there is a long 
term relationship between VIX and credit risk which is robust to the iTraxx maturity 
chosen. The constant term γ0 is negative for the 10 year iTraxx maturity whereas 
positive for the 3 year maturity iTraxx. As it is the case with the 5 year iTraxx, short 
cash positions are required on average to replicate 10 year CDS with the VIX portfolio. 
Long positions cash positions are required to replicate 3 year CDS. We find positive 
signs for the γ0 parameter in only 3 cases of the VIX and 3 year individual CDS 
analysed,
19 and in 10 out of the 35 VIX and 10 year individual CDS analysed.  
We find evidence of cointegration between VIX and firm level CDS for 3 year and 10 
year maturities. Estimates reported in table Table Ia fail to reject cointegration at the 5% 
level for all companies analysed apart from Vodafone. Conflicting signs in the VECM 
error correction estimates for LVMH Moet Hennessy, Eurpn Aero Defence, Koninklijke 
Philips Electrs N V, Metro AG and Repsol YPF SA confirm 41 out of the 47 cases of 
cointegration at 5% significance level.  
 Table IIIa in the appendix reports cointegration results for VIX and 10 year CDS. We  
find evidence of  cointegration  at the 5% significance level in 39 out of the 47 pairs 
considered.   Conflicting signs in the VECM error correction estimates for Bayer, Eurpn 
Aero Defence, Hellenic Telecom Org, Metro AG, Repsol YPF SA and Tesco Plc 
confirms 33 out of the 47 pairs analysed. Cointegration results are therefore also robust 
to the CDS maturity chosen. 
20 
Table I: The long Run Relation between the Price of  5 year Credit 
Risk in CDS and VIX markets 
Samples June 2004-December 2009 (iTraxx) 
July 2002- December 2009  (CDS) 
t-statistics are given in parenthesis 
  Number of Cointe vectors 
Estimated coefficients 




At Most one 
(95% c.v. 9.14) 1  -γ1 - γo 
iTraxx5 32.193 2.907 -4.121 20.625 
         (-14.12) (2.98) 
AB Volvo  34.704 4.352 -14.882 209.584 
                                                            
19 Four coefficients had positive sign and one of them was not significant. 
20 Robustness is also found with respect to lag length. 16 
 
       (-9.37) (5.61) 
ACCOR 20.710 5.923 -5.719 28.935 
       (-5.14) (1.09) 
AKZO Nobel N V  39.645 4.325 -2.742 9.159 
         (-12.11) (1.72) 
Aegon N.V.  28.511 4.529 -10.125 127.413 
         (-11.02) (5.83) 
Aviva plc  34.896 6.303 -7.356 89.989 
         (-8.36) (4.33) 
Bay Motoren Werke 
AG 32.231 4.004 -9.200 124.109 
         (-11.09) (6.37) 
Bayer AG  29.641 8.754 -2.588 5.038 
         (-6.52) (0.53) 
Bca Monte dei Paschi   28.403 2.474 -3.261 28.944 
         (-8.49) (3.16) 
Bertelsmann AG  39.255 6.506 -7.875 80.627 
         (-9.59) (4.17) 
Brit Amern Tob plc  22.290 7.107 -2.836 -3.630 
         -(4.94) (-0.27) 
Brit Telecom PLC  21.115 6.420 -4.864 29.212 
         (-6.95) (1.75) 
Carrefour 38.484 3.169 -2.032 5.933 
        (-14.69) (1.82) 
Cie de St Gobain  47.432 2.580 -9.493 106.276 
       (-16.88) (7.98) 
Commerzbank AG  23.499 4.332 -3.965 32.828 
 (-6.14) (2.14) 
Compass Gp PLC  19.424 5.395 -0.153 -50.573 
       (-0.30) (-4.25) 
Deutsche Bk AG  22.400 1.734 -4.217 44.653 
 (-8.32) (3.73) 
Deutsche Telekom AG  29.957 7.955 -2.769 -3.874 
         (-2.94) (-0.17) 
Diageo PLC  20.132 4.505 -2.545 14.828 
       (-7.00) (1.73) 
E.ON AG  28.384 4.633 -2.613 15.656 
         (-11.63) (2.96) 
ENEL S p A  36.256 5.339 -10.024 141.982 
         (-9.52) (5.68) 
Eurpn Aero Defence   70.688 5.674 -6.996 80.004 
         (-18.51) (8.91) 
Fortum Oyj  47.032 3.615 -2.132 3.773 
         (-15.18) (1.17) 
France Telecom  52.662 6.030 -1.086 -26.492 
         (-1.06) (-1.10) 
Hannover Ruck AG  19.416 4.386 -2.171 4.064 
       (-5.77) (0.47) 
Hellenic Telecom SA  42.173 6.685 -0.251 -0.987 
         (-10.95) (-1.81) 
Iberdrola S A  34.573 5.268 -0.4208 3.656 
         (-14.74) (5.45) 17 
 
Koninklijke KPN N V  50.534 6.171   -1.089 -40.325 
         (-2.17) (-3.41) 
Koninklijke Philips 
Electrs N V  36.487 6.914 -2.946 11.614 
         (-9. 80) (1.62) 
LVMH Moet 
Hennessy Louis 
Vuitton 44.424 6.719 -3.410 16.841 
         (-13.51) (2.81) 
METRO AG  69.130 5.251   -6.483 52.853 
         (-16.76) (5.84) 
Marks & Spencer p l c  18.953 3.501   -8.148 37.250 
       (-4.92) (0.97) 
Munich Re  22.492 6.462 -1.717 2.143 
         (-6.00) (0.32) 
RWE AG  26.272 5.352 -2.475 15.223 
         (-7.72) (2.06) 
Repsol YPF SA  53.389 6.237 -7.887 -82.60 
 (-16.20) (-7.10) 
Royal Bk Scotland plc  18.044 1.598 -6.350 81.830 
       (-6.35) (3.50) 
Siemens AG  39.369 4.272 -3.880 36.870 
         (-16.17) (6.59) 
Telecom Italia SpA  29.453 7.324 -2.840 -20.100 
         (-5.57) (-1.63) 
Telefonica S A  29.453 7.324 -2.840 -2.010 
         (-5.57) (-0.16) 
Tesco PLC  29.089 2.807 -0.433 49.92 
         (-0.88) (4.34) 
Unilever N V  39.635 5.882 -1.280 -0.365 
         (-128.0) (0.15) 
Utd Utils plc  19.554 3.847 -2.370 5.16 
       (-5.27) (0.48) 
Vattenfall AB  41.319 5.960 -1.890 4.12 
         (11.81) (1.11) 
Veolia Environnement  30.242 4.786 -3.650 15.48 
         (-11.41) (2.15) 
Vodafone Gp PLC  27.749 6.805 -3.920 25.83 
         (-11.88) (3.27) 
Volkswagen AG  24.479 3.705 -7.140 67.85 
         (8.60) (3.46) 
WPP 2005 Ltd  48.003 3.183 -11.260 0.01275 
         (17.87) (7.68) 
Wolters Kluwer N V  29.82 20.262 -1.210 -30.070 
         (41.72) (4.49) 
The first two columns of Table I present Johansen trace test statistics for the number of 
cointegrating relations between the CDS price and the credit spread over swap rates. In line with the 
theoretical prediction a constant is included in the long term statistical relation The number of lags 
is optimized using the AIC criteria for each company. The third and fourth columns present the 
estimated cointegrating relationship coefficients γ0 and γ1 .t ratios are given in parenthesis  
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It might be argued that the predominance of cointegration in the pairs considered arises 
due to the lack of robustness of the Johansen and Dickey Fuller test under the presence 
of heteroskedasticity in the VIX series. Lee and Tse (1996) examine the performance of 
Johansen´s (1988) likelihood ratio test for cointegration in the presence of a GARCH 
process, and compare it with competing cointegration test. They conclude that, although 
the tests tend to over reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in favour of finding 
cointegration, the problem is generally not very serious. Therefore we can conclude that 
cointegration in the VIX and CDS markets is robust to the existence heteroskedasticity.   
Given the Granger (1981) representation theorem, the dynamics of two cointegrated 
variables are represented by the VECM in (3). zt-1 is the long term relationship that 
governs both variables and the adjustment coefficient or adjustment vector describes 
how fast VIX and iTraxx/individual CDSs adjust when there are (short lived) deviations 
from the equilibrium relationship.  
The construction of pairs strategies requires some measurement of   the adjustment 
speed in number of trading days within a given sample. We define the half-life of the 
cointegrating error, as the number of periods required for a 1 standard deviation shock 
to dissipate by one-half in its first-order autoregression. Following Kim (2005), the half-
life in our 5 year iTraxx and VIX sample is 8.25 days, indicating a smooth convergence 
to equilibrium. This allows opportunities to benefit from pairs strategies within a three 
week period range. 
The first row in table II reports VECM and price discovery estimates for VIX and 5 year 
iTraxx. The adjustment coefficient for iTraxx (α1) suggests that the partial effect of one 
unit increase in the cointegrating error, is an expected adjustment of iTraxx by 2%. The 
corresponding point estimate for VIX (α2) is not significantly different from zero. This 
suggests that iTraxx clearly does all the adjustment in terms of restoring arbitrage 
equilibrium.  The VIX market does not adjust to the iTraxx market, implying that it is 
the determinant factor in the price discovery process. 
21 The predominance of VIX  in 
the  price discovery process is robust to the iTraxx maturity chosen as it is shown in the 
first rows of tables IIa and IV a in the appendix. 
                                                            
21  This means that VIX is essentially (weakly) exogenous with respect to the cointegration relationship, 
meaning that it adjusts instantaneously to its new equilibrium level. Although the point estimate for PDv 
is 0.847  t statistics indicate  that common factor weights are PDx=0 and  PDv=1 respectively 19 
 
The remaining rows of table II, report VECM estimates and VIX´s price discovery 
metric (PDv) for cointegrated  pairs of  VIX and individual company CDSs. In 38 out of 
the 39 companies analysed α1 is significantly positive indicating that the VIX market 
contributes to price discovery.
 22  The CDS market appears to have a significant role in 
eight out of the 39 cases.
 Of these cases, the CDS market in the only source of all 
information in only one case (Deutche Bank AG). This shows that Deutche Bank CDS 
adjust faster to event risk conditions than the VIX market does, reflecting the global 
nature of Deuche Bank´s portfolio. In this case the common factor is driven solely by 
the CDS.
23 In seven cases both the VIX market and the CDS market contribute 
significantly to price discovery. In 30 pairs analysed we find that  α2 is not significant 
while α1  is significantly different from zero, implying that  VIX  is the leader in the 
price discovery process with common factor weights PDx =0  and PDv = 1. Note that in 
8 out of the 39 companies analysed the PDv measure produces a statistic greater than 
one which is difficult to interpret since, as specified in (6) and (7) both price discovery 
metrics should be positive and add up to one ( PDx =1- PDv ). Although it arises due to 
negative signs in both speed of adjustment coefficients (α1 and α2) in all of these cases, 
α2 is not significantly different from zero, indicating price leadership in the VIX market.    
In the three year CDS case we find that VIX is the sole contributor to price discovery in 
34 out of 41 cointegrated pairs.  Moreover, the three year CDS market does not 
dominate in any of the examples analysed. Both, the VIX market and the CDS market 
contribute to price discovery in seven cases. The price discovery metric for the VIX 
market  PDv is greater than one in eight of the individual company cases analyzed. 
Again, this arises because the estimated α2 is negative but not significantly different 
from zero. 
Estimates in table IVa in the appendix show that, for the 10 year CDSs, out of the 33 
cointegrated cases, VIX dominates in terms of price discovery in 22 cases. The CDS 
market is the sole contributor to price discovery in two cases Deutche Bank and Utd 
                                                            
22 Note due to their conflicting signs, we do not report PDv estimates for Eurpn Aero Defence, Metro AG 
Repsol YPF and thus exclude them from the discussion of price discovery results 
23 The point estimate for PDv is 0.457 and t statistics indicate that  common factor weights are PDx=1 
and  PDv=0. 20 
 
Utils plc and both, the VIX market and the CDS market contribute in the price 
discovery process for 9 out of the 33 cases.
24  
The VIX index and iTraxx as well as individual CDSs are traded asynchronously 
mainly due to the difference in trading times in Europe and the US (5 hours). There is 
large amount of literature that has studied price discovery in related securities (see 
Hasbrouck 2003) or cross listed shares (see Pascual et al. 2006 and Hupperest and 
Menkveld 2002). The later analyze price discovery of shares cross listed in US and 
Europe concentrating on the overlapping interval (3 hours). The general conclusion is 
that European listed stocks are leaders in the price discovery process.  On the basis of 
these results, we are able to confirm that the predominance of VIX (US) over 
iTraxx/CDS (Europe) does not arise due to the existence of non synchronous trading.  
Table II: VECM estimates and Contribution to Price Discovery 
(5 year iTraxx and CDS maturity) 
Samples June 2004-December 2009 (iTraxx) 
July 2002- December 2009  (CDS) 
  Number of Cointe vectors   
  α1  α2 PDv  
    
iTraxx5 -0.020  0.004  0.847
 
   (-4.12)  (1.39)     
AB Volvo  -0.008  0.000  0.958 
 (-4.91)  (  0.77)     
ACCOR -0.005  0.001  0.819 
 (-3.21)  (  1.398)     
AKZO Nobel N V  -0.020  -0.001  1.047 
   (-5.78)  (-0.328)     
Aegon N.V.  -0.009  0.002  0.803
**
   (-2.81)  (2.98)     
Aviva plc  -0.011  0.001  0.954 
   (-4.97)  ( 0.71)     
Bay Motoren Werke AG  -0.011  0.002  0.868
**
   (-4.04)  ( 1.98)     
Bayer AG  -0.014  -0.001  1.078   
   (-4.37)  (-0.51)     
Bca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena S p A  -0.012  0.004  0.750
**  
   (-3.82)  (2.23)     
Bertelsmann AG  -0.010  0.000  0.990   
                                                            
24 Note that in 7 out of the 33 companies analyzed the PDv measure produces a statistic greater than one. 
This arises due to negative signs in both speed of adjustment coefficients ( 1 α and  2 α ). However, as for 
the 3 and 5 years CDS, in all cases α2 is not significantly different from zero, indicating price leadership 
in the VIX market. 21 
 
   (-5.58)  ( 0.14)     
Brit Amern Tob plc  -0.009  0.002  0.858   
   (-3.46)  ( 0.92)     
Brit Telecom PLC  -0.008  0.001  0.854   
   (-3.06)  ( 1.03)     
Carrefour  -0.022  0.008  0.720   
  (-4.65)  (1.88)    
Cie de Saint Gobain  -0.015  0.003  0.845   
  (-5.08)  ( 2.90)    
CommerceBank AG  -0.090 0.003  0.786   
  (-3.261) (  2.06)    
Deutche Bk AG  -0.005 0.006  0.457  
  (1.41) (3.64)   
Deutsche Telekom AG  -0.007 0.000  0.991   
   (-4.22) (0.08)    
ENEL S p A  -0.010 0.001  0.948   
   (-5.23) (  0.879)    
Fortum Oyj  -0.024  -0.001  1.037   
   (-5.90)  (-0.21)     
France Telecom  -0.007  0.000  1.057   
   (-6.74)  (-0.70)     
Hellenic Telecom Org SA  -0.026  -0.014  2.215   
   (-5.84)  (-0.52)     
Iberdrola S A  -0.018  0.035  0.333   
   (-4.64)  ( 1.49)     
Koninklijke KPN N V  -0.011  -0.001  1.112   
   (-6.59)  (-1.01)     
Koninklijke Philips Electrs 
N V  -0.013  -0.002  1.147   
   (-5.37)  (-0.76)     
LVMH Moet 
 
(-6.07)   (-1.55)  1.202  
        
Munich Re  -0.015  0.001  0.911   
   (-3.61)  (0.47)     
RWE AG  -0.010  0.003  0.774   
   (-3. 90)  (1.17)     
Siemens AG  -0.016  0.006  0.707
**  
   (-4.41)  ( 2.50)     
Telecom Italia SpA  -0.012  -0.006  1.872   
   (-4.47)  (-0.37)     
Telefonica S A  -0.012  -0.001  1.049   
   (-4.47)  (-0.37)     
Tesco PLC  0.000  0.000  0.798   
   (4.31)  (-1.24)     
Unilever N V  -0.023  0.008  0.736   
   (-5.17)  ( 1.37)     
Vattenfall AB  -0.020  0.002  0.899   
   (-5.83)  (-0.57)     
Veolia Environnement  -0.019  0.002  0.987   
   (-4.84)  ( 0.10)     22 
 
Vodafone Gp PLC  -0.010  0.006  0.500
**  
   (-2.91)  ( 2.54)     
Volkswagen AG  -0.010  0.013  0.884   
   (-3.54)  ( 1.31)     
WPP 2005 Ltd  -0.023  -0.001  1.004   
   (-6.58)  (-0.67)     
Wolters Kluwer N V  -0.016  0.000  0.980   
   (-4.62)  ( 0.12)     
This table presents (point) estimates of the adjustment vector in the VECM 
specified in (3) as well as the contribution of the Price Discovery in the VIX 
market (PDv) as specified in (5).  ** denote rejection of predominance of VIX 
leadership in the price discovery process (PDx=0, PDv=1) at the 5% significance 
level on the basis of reported t statistics. In order for (PDx=0, PDv=1) to be 
accepted we require that α1 is significantly different from zero (at 5%) level while 
α2 not being significantly different from zero. 
 
 
In most cases analysed the VIX index is the dominant contributor to the common factor 
in the price discovery process suggesting that global risk (as measured by the VIX 
index) adjusts faster to changes in event risk (the common factor). This is true for all 
iTraxx/CDS maturities considered, although stronger for the 5 and 3 year case. This 
implies that, on average, if there is temporary mispricing between VIX and credit risk 
market (zt >0) it is the credit derivatives market that does the adjustment to the new 
equilibrium and not the VIX market.  On the basis of theoretical framework, as 
underlined in equation (2) this implies that a) the VIX derivatives market has a higher 
number of participants than the credit risk market, suggesting that it trades at higher 
volumes b) arbitrageurs will benefit from riskless profits as long as credit risk 
adjustment to deviations from equilibrium is not immediate (i.e. zt ± 0). 
 
5.  Proposed “pairs trading” strategies  
In this section we investigate the possibility of earning abnormal profits pursuing pairs 
trading strategies in the VIX and CDS markets. This is a classic trading strategy for 
speculators or hedge funds. It relies on a well known trading rule for cointegrated price 
series based on the following proposition: an investor should open a long-short position 
when the paired prices have diverged by a certain amount and close the position when 
prices have reverted (see for instance Gatev Goezman and Rouwenhorst 2006).
 25 When 
                                                            
25 Gatev Goezman and Rouwenhorst 2006 define deviations in terms of two historical standard deviations 
away from the long term equilibrium. We take 1 standard deviation to be significant. 
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an investor has opened a position he shorts the out-performer and longs the 
underperformer, hoping that eventually they will converge to their long run equilibrium 
level. Profits are defined by return differentials as specified in (8) and (9). Once there is 
equilibrium reversion, the trading position is closed.  
Pairs strategies have certain characteristics. Typically, they are not highly exposed to 
market crashes. This is because, if the market goes down, the investor looses from the 
long position and wins from the short position. From the nature of their construction, 
one can bet on the long run relationship of the two, so the strategy is mean reverting. 
They are also low cost strategies, as an investor can bet the proceedings from the short 
position to finance the long position. However, they do not imply a risk-free portfolio, 
when VIX and CDSs move away from their long term equilibrium, the holder of pairs 
strategies will incur a loss if there is no short term reversion.  
Table III reports average daily profits
26 and (simplified) daily Sharpe Ratios, assuming 
zero risk free rate for the sample period analysed. We can see that pairs strategies 
deliver improved average profits and performance than investing in iTraxx or VIX 
alone. The same analysis is performed for cointegrated pairs of VIX and individual 
company CDSs. Figures are reported in table IV. Pairs strategies deliver positive mean 
profits for all cointegrated pairs analysed.
  As it is the case for the CDS portfolio, 
performance, as measured by the simplified Sharpe Ratio, is superior than betting on 
VIX or iTraxx alone. 
Table III: Expected Returns, Volatilities and 
Performance Measures for different trading 
Strategies (June 2004-December 2009) 
    µ   σ  
Sharpe 
Ratio 
 Itraxx  0.001 0.038  0.029 
 VIX  0.002 0.066  0.036 
 Pairs    0.337 5.543  0.066 
       
This table reports  mean daily profits, volatility (measured by 
the standard deviation) and Sharpe Ratios for three strategies i)  
long position iTraxx ii) long position in VIX iii) pairs 









26 Units are basis points minus volatility points or vice versa. 24 
 
Table IV: Expected Returns, Volatilities and Performance 
Measures for Pairs strategies between VIX and individual 
CDS (August 2002-December 2009) 
  µ  σ 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
VIX 0.000  0.060  -0.005 
AB Volvo  0.3337  5.540  0.061 
0ACCOR 0.000  0.000  0.185 
AKZO Nobel N V  0.289  2.715  0.106 
Aviva plc  0.143  2.085  0.069 
Aegeon 0.242  2.577  0.094 
Bay Motoren Werke AG  0.324  2.495  0.130 
Bayer 0.230  3.254  0.071 
Bca Monte dei Paschi   0.197  2.411  0.082 
Bertelsmann AG  0.118 2.833 0.042
Brit Amern Tob plc  0.186 2.339 0.080
British Telecom  0.163 1.933 0.085
Carrefour 0.186 2.339 0.080
Cie de St Gobain  0.234 1.988 0.118
Commerzbank AG  0.282 2.378 0.119
Deutsche Bk AG  0.200 2.232 0.090
Deutsche Telekom AG  0.171 1.971 0.087
Diageo 0.184 3.827 0.048
Enel 0.120 2.118 0.057
E.ON AG  0.301 2.422 0.124
Fortum Oyj  0.292 2.682 0.109
France Telecom  0.249 2.216 0.112
Hannover Ruck AG  0.251 2.377 0.106
Hellenic Telecom Org SA  0.149 2.113 0.071
Koninklijke Philips Electrs N   0.308 2.211 0.139
Marks & Spencer p l c  0.264 2.012 0.131
Iberdrola 0.115 1.804 0.064
LVMH Moet  0.245 2.785 0.088
Munich Re  0.251 2.207 0.114
Repsol 0.280 2.606 0.108
RWE  AG  0.212 2.694 0.079
Telefonica S A  0.190 2.259 0.084
Siemens 0.110 1.769 0.062
Telecom Italia SPA  0.261 3.421 0.076
Uniliver 0.116 1.865 0.062
Veolia 0.076 1.893 0.040
Vattenfall AB  0.160 2.737 0.058
Vodafone Gp PLC  0.210 1.945 0.108
Volswagen AG  0.258 2.335 0.111
Wolters Kluwer SA  0.085 0.866 0.098
WPP 2005 Ltd  0.159 2.682 0.059
This table reports  mean daily profits, volatility (measured by the standard deviation) 
and Sharpe Ratios for two strategies i)  long position in VIX ii) pairs strategies between 
VIX and individual company CDSs 25 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This article exploits a highly comprehensive data set on European iTraxx/CDSs and 
VIX to analyse the nature of the link between credit risk and market risk. We contribute 
to the small empirical literature that associates volatility and CDS markets by reporting 
the following  findings. 
First, VIX and CDS are theoretically linked on the basis of Merton´s framework. 
Therefore there exists a valid cointegrating relation between VIX and credit risk at 
portfolio and individual company level.  A demand and supply model for VIX and CDS 
market participants is used to demonstrate how arbitrageurs restore equilibrium 
mispricing pursuing pairs trading strategies. 
Second, profits from pairs strategies can be represented through parameters in VECM 
model, in a framework where only under significant transaction costs, there is room to 
benefit from pairs strategies.   
Third, the VIX market leads the CDS market in the price discovery process. This 
implies that VIX adjusts faster to changes in event risk conditions than the CDS market 
and holds for CDS portfolios and individual company CDS. Out of the 39 cointegrated 
pairs, we find that in 30 cases the VIX market is the leader in the price discovery 
process. This result is robust to different CDS maturity chosen and suggests that VIX 
should be an improved predictor of CDS spreads than other volatility measures 
proposed in the recent literature of CDS pricing (see Zhang et. al 2009) 
Fourth, we generate profits from pairs strategies and show that average profits from 
pairs strategies are always positive and higher than profits from investing in VIX or 
iTraxx alone.  
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Appendix A0: Theoretical link between the CDS and VIX market 
 
A simple credit risk model, may be described on the basis of market values of assets  A , 
with stochastic process: 
  AA dA Adt AdW μ σ = +  (A0.  1) 
Where μA, σA are the expected returns and volatility of the market value assets A .  
We consider a company that has debt holders (CDS) and equity holders. Both have an 
option on the assets of the firm. Merton 1974, assumes that μA, σA are constant, so that 
Black Scholes formula applies.  The price of an equity claim (E) would be a function of 







∂  (A0.2) 
Let’s write (VIX)
2 , as the risk neutral expectation of the future quadratic variation, say 
over the next month: 
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Appendix A1: Theoretical model for dynamics of VIX and CDS  Markets 
 
Let´s assume that there are Nx participants in the credit derivatives market and Nv participants in 
VIX derivatives market. Let Pi,t be the net position of the i
th participant immediately prior to 
period t and  Bi,t the bid  price at which that participant is willing to hold the position Pi,t. Then 
the demand schedule of the i
th participant in the credit derivatives market in period t is   
  ,, ( ),                0,     i 1,...., ,             it t it x PA x B A N − −> = (A1.1) 
where A is the elasticity of demand, assumed to be the same for all participants. Note that due to 
the dynamic structure to be imposed to the bid price, Bi,t, the relevant results in our theoretical 
framework are robust  to a more general structure of the elasticity of demand, such as, Ai=A + 
ai, where ai  is an independent random variable, with  E(ai) = 0 and V(ai) = σ
2
i<∞.  
The demand schedule for the j
th participant in the VIX market is  
  ,, ( ),                0,     j 1,...., ,             it t jt v PA v B A N − −> = (A1.2) 
The aggregate market demand schedule of agents pursuing pairs strategies in the credit and VIX 
markets in period t is 
 
() () 10 ,                0,                 






=>  (A1.3) 
where zt represents the transaction costs involved in opening and closing positions in the CDS 
and VIX portfolio, and H is the elasticity of market demand for pair strategies. As previously 
discussed, it is finite when the arbitrage transactions of buying in the credit market and selling 
in the VIX derivatives market or vice versa are not risk less.  
The credit market will clear at the value of xt that solves, 
  () () () () ,, , 1 0
11
           0,  
xx NN
it it t it t t
ii
PP A x B H v x  H γγ
==
=− − + + − > ∑∑  (A1.4) 
The VIX derivatives market will clear at the value of vt such that 
  () () () () ,, , 1 0
11
   
v N Nv
jt jt t jt t t
ji
PP A v B H vx   γγ
==
=− − − + − ∑∑  (A1.5) 31 
 
Solving equations (A.1.4) and (A.1.5) for xt and vt as a function of the mean bid price set by 
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To derive the dynamic price relationships, the model in equation (A.1.6) must be characterized 
with a description of the evolution of bid prices. It is assumed that immediately after the market 
clearing period t-1 the i
th CDS market participant was willing to hold a position Pi,t  at a price xt-
1. Following FG, this implies that xt-1 was his bid price after that clearing. We assume that this 
bid price changes to Bi,t according to the equation         
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where the vector() ,, ,, ti t j t ew w  is vector white noise with finite variance.  
The price change Bi,t - xt-1 reflects the arrival of new information between period t-1 and period t 
which changes the price at which the i
th participant is willing to hold the position Pi,t  in the 
credit derivatives market. This price change has a component common to all participants (et) 
and a component idiosyncratic to the i
th participant (wi,t). The equations in (A.1.7) imply that the 
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. Substituting expressions (A.1.6) into (A.1.6) yields 
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We now convert (A.1.9) into a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) by subtracting (xt-1, vt-
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Appendix A.2 Empirical Cointegration and Price Discovery Results 
 
 
Table I a: 
The long Lun Relationship between the Price of 3 year CDS and VIX markets 
Samples June 2004-December 2009 (iTraxx) 
July 2002- December 2009  (CDS) 
  
Estimated Coefficients (1, -γ1, -γ0) 





At Most one 
95% c.v= 9.14    -γ1 -γ0 
iTraxx3 23.622  2.735    -2.971  -15.501 
       (0.278)  (6.627) 
AB Volvo  35.210  4.976    -15.791  238.828 
       (-9.479)  (6.097) 
ACCOR 26.083  5.990    -0.189  -7.172 
       (-5.777)  (-2.522) 
AKZO Nobel N V  36.985  4.741    -0.322  2.900 
       (0.028)  (0.662) 
Aegon N.V.  27.794  4.783    -10.472  143.856 
       -(10.702)  (6.181) 
Aviva plc  35.235  6.465    -7.584  102.116 
       (-8.122)  (4.631) 
Bay Motoren Werke AG  24.932  4.830    -9.893  146.666 
       (-8.553)  (5.357) 
Bayer AG  34.101  8.617    -2.953  22.050 
       (0.362)  (2.565) 
Bca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena   36.433  2.648    -3.265  34.859 
       (-10.209)  (4.639) 
Bertelsmann AG  66.430  7.124    -7.322  85.084 
       (-12.887)  (6.290) 
Brit Amern Tob plc  26.973  6.150    -3.229  17.542 
       (-6.512)  (1.492) 
Brit Telecom PLC  25.469  6.924    -4.878  44.807 
       (-8.916)  (3.435) 
Carrefour 59.616  3.859    -2.152  16.276 
       (-20.998)  (6.731) 
Cie de St Gobain  52.070  3.259    -10.526  138.361 
       (-17.435)  (9.688) 
Commerzbank AG  25.546  4.470    -3.778  37.881 
       (-6.919)  (2.927) 
Compass Gp PLC  22.909  6.094    -1.045  -18.199 
       (0.321)  (7.427) 
Deutsche Bk AG  27.765  2.175    -4.142  50.146 
       (-9.445)  (4.849) 
Deutsche Telekom AG  34.111  6.857    -3.902  31.465 
       (-5.111)  (1.731) 
Diageo PLC  31.738  5.892    -2.452  21.469 
       (-10.729)  (3.997) 
E.ON AG  47.494  4.874    -2.805  26.012 
       (-19.904)  (7.852) 35 
 
ENEL S p A  36.298  5.587    -10.979  167.637 
       (-9.202)  (5.920) 
Eurpn Aero Defence   57.624  5.654    -7.667  102.410 
       (-15.272)  (8.591) 
Fortum Oyj  64.768  3.624    -2.461  17.599 
       (0.113)  (2.623) 
France Telecom  48.911  6.277    -1.955  5.023 
       (-1.537)  (0.167) 
Hannover Ruck AG  22.892  4.369    -2.393  16.410 
       (-8.142)  (2.431) 
Hellenic Telecom Org 
SA 57.855  5.410    -3.092  14.420 
       -(16.107)  (3.210) 
Iberdrola S A  41.147  5.315    -4.620  52.353 
       (-16.923)  (8.151) 
Koninklijke KPN N V  55.315  6.437    -1.957  -6.746 
       (-4.557)  (-0.663) 
Koninklijke Philips 
Electrs N V  59.375  6.111    -3.201  25.740 
       (-14.938)  (5.057) 
LVMH Moet Hennessy 
Louis Vuitton  54.852  6.809   
-3.768 
33.989 
       (16.780)  (6.376) 
METRO AG  68.010  5.850    -6.970  76.028 
       (-16.780)  (6.376) 
Marks & Spencer p l c  26.301  2.846    -10.252  119.406 
       (-8.846)  (4.449) 
Munich Re  26.824  6.334    -1.842  11.396 
       (0.214)  (5.011) 
RWE AG  39.079  5.574    -2.559  23.708 
       (-11.011)  (4.313) 
Repsol YPF SA  59.643  8.460    -8.370  102.060 
   0.068    (-144.310  (7.450) 
Royal Bk Scotland plc  18.855  2.124    -6.190  83.700 
       (-6.516)  (3.805) 
Siemens AG  42.361  4.051    -4.110  48.790 
       (-17.870)  (8.871) 
Telecom Italia SpA  32.988  7.348    -3.600  23.970 
       (-8.571)  (2.421) 
Telefonica S A  32.112  6.975    -3.730  26.860 
       (-9.098)  (2.741) 
Tesco PLC  41.362  3.945    4.080  52.340 
       (12.000)  (6.710) 
Unilever N V  49.268  4.884    -1.390  0.821 
       (-15.618)  (0.391) 
Utd Utils plc  26.434  3.469    -2.440  15.590 
       (-8.133)  (2.196) 
Vattenfall AB  51.863  6.859    -0.205  14.520 
       (0.140)  (3.300) 
Veolia Environnement  37.362  5.026    -4.350  39.020 
       (-140.323)  (5.574) 
Vodafone Gp PLC  38.552  20.262    -4.370  45.120 
       (-16.808)  (7.277) 
Volkswagen AG  29.616  4.245    -7.830  94.370 36 
 
       (10.303)  (5.302) 
WPP 2005 Ltd  45.698  3.503    -11.800  155.100 
       (17.101)  (8.617) 
Wolters Kluwer N V  45.223  6.314    -0.180  -5.020 
       (9.000)  (1.046) 
 
The first two columns of Table Ia present Johansen trace test statistics for the number of cointegrating relations 
between the CDS price and the credit spread over swap rates. In line with the theoretical prediction a constant is 
included in the long term statistical relation The number of lags is optimized using the AIC criteria for each 
company. The third and fourth columns present the estimated cointegrating relationship coefficients γ0 and γ1 .t 





Table II a: VECM estimates and Contribution to price Discovery 3 year CDS 
Samples June 2004-December 2009 (iTraxx) 
July 2002- December 2009  (CDS) 
  α1  α2 PDv  
iTraxx3 -0.021  0.005  0.811  
   (-3.296)  (1.431)     
AB Volvo  -0.008  0.000  0.988  
  (-5.10) (  0.225)     
ACCOR -0.008  0.000  0.964  
  (-4.272) (0.310)     
AKZO Nobel N V  -0.003  -0.024  2.365  
   (-5.534)  (-0.421)     
Aegon N.V.  -0.013  0.002   0.894
**  
   (-3.560)  (2.076)     
Aviva plc  -0.011  0.000  0.983  
   (-4.864)  (0.258)     
Bay Motoren Werke 





    
Bayer AG  -0.016  -0.001  1.093  
   (-5.005)  (-0.660)     
Bca Monte dei Paschi 






    
Bertelsmann AG  -0.018  -0.001  1.057  
   (-7.656)  (-1.145)     
Brit Amern Tob plc  -0.011  0.001  0.912  
   (-4.289)  ( 0.646)     
Brit Telecom PLC  -0.012  0.001  0.949  
   (-4.052)  ( 0.410)     
Carrefour -0.031  0.003  0.914  
   (-6.804) (  0.604)     
Cie de St Gobain  -0.017  0.002  0.919
**  
 (-6.184)  (  1.736)     
Commerzbank AG  -0.012  0.002  0.845  37 
 
   (-3.774)  ( 1.522)     
Compass Gp PLC  -0.013  -0.004  1.368  
   (-4.019)  (-1.229)     
Deutsche Bk AG  -0.011  0.005  0.673
**  
   (-3.063)  (3.206)     





    
Diageo PLC  -0.016  0.001  0.963  
   (-4.868)  ( 0.191)     
E.ON AG  -0.025  0.006  0.798
**  
   (-5.553)  ( 1.604)     
ENEL S p A  -0.010  0.000  0.971  
   (-5.311)  (0.539)     
Fortum Oyj  -0.035  -0.004  1.128  
   (-7.669)  (-0.883)     
France Telecom  -0.006  0.000  1.060  
   (-6.468)  (-0.815)     
Hannover Ruck AG  -0.019  0.001  0.930  
   (-4.014)  (0.475)     
Hellenic Telecom   -0.030  -0.004  1.154  
   (-7.191)  (-1.452)     
Iberdrola S A  -0.019  0.002  0.900  
   (-5.436)  ( 0.947)     
Koninklijke KPN N V  -0.011  -0.001  1.135  
   (-6.797)  (-1.168)     





    
Munich Re  -0.021  0.002  0.900  
   (-4.160)  (0.608)     
RWE AG  -0.014  0.002  0.861  
   (-5.316)  ( 0.820)     
Royal Bk Scotland plc  -0.006  0.003  0.671
**  
   (-1.854)  ( 3.053)     
Siemens AG  -0.000  0.000  0.827  
   ( 5.260)  (1.560)     
Telecom Italia SpA  0.000  0.000  0.968  
   (5.0283)  (-0.507)     
Telefonica S A  -0.011  0.000  1.042  
   (-3.980)  (-0.289)   
          
Tesco PLC  -0.012  0.000  0.987  
   (-5.796)  (0.084)     
Unilever N V  -0.032  -0.002  1.081  
   (-6.535)  (-0.389)     
Utd Utils plc  -0.009  0.007  0.571
**  
   (-3.491)  (2.641)     
Vattenfall AB  -0.025  -0.060  1.328  
   (-6.946)  (-1.500)     
Veolia Environnement  -0.020  -0.0009  1.047  38 
 
   (-5.540)  (-0.406)     
        
Volkswagen AG  -0.012  0.001  1.000  
   (-4.206)  ( 0.858)     
WPP 2005 Ltd  -0.022  -0.001  1.062  
   (-6.397)  (-1.066)     
Wolters Kluwer N V  -0.024  0.000  1.015  
   (-6.040)  (-0.125)     
This table presents (point) estimates of the adjustment vector in the VECM specified in (3) as 
well as the contribution of the Price Discovery in the VIX market (PDv) as specified in (5).  ** 
denote rejection of predominance of VIX leadership in the price discovery process  (PDx=0, 
PDv=1) at the 5% significance level on the basis of reported t statistics. In order for (PDx=0, 
PDv=1)to be accepted we require that α1 is significantly different from zero (at 5%) level while  





Table III a: The Long Run Relation between the Price of 10 year Credit Risk in CDS and ViX Markets 
Samples June 2004-December 2009 (iTraxx) 
July 2002- December 2009  (CDS) 
  Number of Cointe vectors 
Estimated Coefficients (1, -γ1, -γ0) 





at Most one 
(95% c.v. 9.14) -γ1    -γ0   
iTraxx10 39.690 3.051 -4.891 (-18.539)  48.594 (7.418)
AB Volvo  31.421 4.044 -12.430 (-8.940)  147.884 (4.551)
ACCOR 18.434 6.815 -4.288 (-3.930)  -18.574 (-0.714)
AKZO Nobel N V  38.177 5.507 -1.662 (-8.770)  -25.151 (-5.585)
Aegon N.V.  28.232 4.442 -9.405 (-11.279)  105.807 (5.329)
Aviva plc  32.467 6.741 -7.255 (-8.296)  80.158 (3.935)
Bay Motoren Werke AG  27.492 3.848 -7.287 (-10.028) 77.296 (4.532)
Bayer AG  22.651 8.386 -0.955 (-2.012)  -41.694 (-3.691)
Bca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S p 
A 28.591 2.445 -3.009 (-8.393)  16.222 (1.908)
Bertelsmann AG  32.024 6.764 -7.044 (-7.600)  46.671 (2.134)
Brit Amern Tob plc  22.046 5.553 -0.935 (-2.104)  -59.699 (-5.646)
Brit Telecom PLC  16.488 6.717 -4.998 (-4.466)  7.961 (0.300)
Carrefour 33.112 4.333 -9.825 (-17.519)  -4.897  
Cie de St Gobain  41.675 2.521 -8.020 (-15.146)  63.833 (5.108)
Commerzbank AG  21.772 4.594 -3.719 (-5.294)  21.289 (1.284)
Compass Gp PLC  12.474 3.428 2.037  (-112.335)   
Deutsche Bk AG  20.601 1.718 -3.957 (-7.821)  33.732 (2.827)
Deutsche Telekom AG  29.496 6.397 -1.025 (-1.107)  -60.688 (-2.760)
Diageo PLC  23.965 5.686 -1.706 (-5.969)  -12.300 (-1.788)
E.ON AG  17.327 4.744 -2.041 (-5.910)  -6.146 (-0.758)
ENEL S p A  34.382 4.213 -9.070 (-9.981)  111.267 (5.222)
Eurpn Aero   86.147 5.074 -5.969 (-21.064)  45.821 (6.865)
Fortum Oyj  31.245 3.997 -1.566 (-8.220)  -18.643 (-4.216)
France Telecom  39.495 5.316 0.437 (0.380)  -79.734 (-2.947)
Hannover Ruck AG  21.622 4.374 -1.645 (-5.126)  -14.045 (-1.900)39 
 
Hellenic Telecom Org SA  37.137 4.743 -0.141 (-6.897)  -5.309 (-11.238)
Iberdrola S A  27.093 5.353 -3.319 (-10.114)  8.724 1.135
Koninklijke KPN N V  24.078 5.802 16.986 (3.936) 
-
165.023 (4.012)
Koninklijke Philips Electrs N V  31.950 7.182 -2.119 (-6.492)  -20.178 (-2.595)
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis 
Vuitton 38.388 6.073 -2.630 (-9.223)  -11.317 (-1.678)
METRO AG  69.130 5.251 -5.060 (17.233)  8.457 (1.241)
Marks & Spencer p l c  18.953 3.501 -8.148 (-4.921)  37.250 (0.969)
Munich Re  21.251 5.369 -1.286 (-4.483)  -14.371 (-2.138)
RWE AG  16.536 3.893 -2.246 (-4.768)  -0.298 (-0.027)
Repsol YPF SA  68.976 6.441 -6.374 (14.196)  39.106 (3.643)
Royal Bk Scotland plc  17.828 1.485   -6.130 (-6.320)  73.060 (3.233)
Siemens AG  39.722 4.548 -3.280 (-14.261)  14.130 (2.666)
Telecom Italia SpA  32.775 4.450 -6.760 (-13.000)  6.910 (0.576)
Telefonica S A  26.259 6.098   -1.340 (-2.310)  -50.790 (-3.735)
Tesco PLC  20.241 2.201 -4.280 (-6.485)  36.780 (2.358)
Unilever N V  34.900 6.289 -0.762 (-6.927)  -21.860 (-8.408)
Utd Utils plc  20.233 5.881 -2.120 (4.157)  -13.520 (-1.099)
Vattenfall AB  28.497 6.261 -1.390 (-6.318)  -17.160 (-3.365)
Veolia Environnement  28.528 5.128   -2.510 (-9.296)  -21.150 (-3.467)
Vodafone Gp PLC  21.582 6.427 -3.140 (7.476)  -6.540 (-6540) 
Volkswagen AG  18.858 4.313 -6.150 (6.276) 34.120 (1.471)
WPP 2005 Ltd  43.207 3.166 -10.180 (16.419)  85.600 (5.252)
Wolters Kluwer N V  25.425 6.314 -0.100 (0.263)  -71.880 (-7.987)
The first two columns of Table IIIa present Johansen trace test statistics for the number of cointegrating relations between the 
CDS price and the credit spread over swap rates. In line with the theoretical prediction a constant is included in the long term 
statistical relation The number of lags is optimized using the AIC criteria for each company. The third and fourth columns 







Table IV a: VECM estimates and Contribution to price Discovery 10  year CDS 
Samples June 2004-December 2009 (iTraxx) 
July 2002- December 2009  (CDS) 
  α1 α1 PDv   
iTraxx10 -0.028  0.003  0.897   
 (-4.893)  (  1.085)     
AB Volvo  -0.008  0.000  0.849   
 (-4.561)  (  0.896)     
AKZO Nobel N V  -0.025  -0.001  1.034   
 (-5.557)  (-0.246)     
Aegon N.V.  -0.011  0.002  0.821
**  
 (-2.977)  (  2.766)     
Aviva plc  -0.012  0.001  0.937   
 (-4.708)  (  0.934)     
Bay Motoren Werke AG  -0.012  0.002  0.878   
 (-3.751)  (1.615)     
Bca Monte dei Paschi   -0.014  0.005  0.746
**  40 
 
 (-3.838)  (  2.390)     
Bertelsmann AG  -0.009  0.000  0.980   
 (-4.872)  (0.238)     
Brit Amern Tob plc  -0.013  -0.003  1.244   
 (-4.024)  (-1.313)     
Carrefour -0.021  0.010  0.672
**  
 (-3.947)  (  2.250)     
Cie de St Gobain  -0.014  0.004  0.774
**  
 (-4.022)  (  3.622)     
Commerzbank AG  -0.009  0.002  0.793
**  
 (-3.167)  (1.912)     
Deutsche Bk AG  -0.005  0.006  0.491
**  
 (-1.561)  (3.522)     
Deutsche Telekom AG  -0.008  -0.001  1.093   
 (-4.732)  (-0.774)     
Diageo PLC  -0.008  0.003  0.750
**  
 (-2.231)  (  0.860)     
Enel -0.012  0.001  0.919   
 (-4.928)  (  1.364)     
Fortum Oyj  -0.023  -0.001  1.032   
 (-4.992)  (-0.173)     
France Telecom  -0.005  0.0002  0.954   
 (-4.333)  (  0.432)     
Hannover Ruck AG  -0.020  0.002  0.917   
 (-3.829)  (  0.613)     
Iberdrola S A  -0.016  0.004  0.816   
 (-3.876)  (  1.462)     
Koninklijke KPN N V  -0.007  0.001  0.899   
 (-3.349)  (0.600)     
Koninklijke Philips Electrs N V  -0.014  -0.002  1.181   
 (-4.938)  (-0.944)     
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton  -0.020  -0.003  1.187   
 (-5.626)  (-1.411)     
Munich Re  -0.020  -0.001  1.038   
 (-3.904)  (-0.227)     
Siemens AG  0.000  -0.000  0.652   
 (4.66)  (0.627)     
Telecom Italia SpA  0.000  -0.0001  0.958   
 (4.092)  (-0.080)     
Telefonica S A  -0.012  0.000  1.011   
 (-4.092)  (-0.080)     
Unilever N V  -0.027  0.009  1.000   
 (-4.740)  (1.432)     
Utd Utils plc  -0.003  0.006  0.483
**  
 (-1.318)  (  3.295)     
Vattenfall AB  -0.017  -0.002  1.141   
 (-4.643)  (-0.567)     
Veolia Environment  -0.019  0.000  0.987   
 (-4.845)  (  0.102)     
Vodafone Gp PLC  -0.006  0.006  0.500
**  
 (-1.958)  (  2.602)     41 
 
WPP 2005 Ltd  -0.022  -0.001  1.036   
 (-6.191)  (-0.562)     
Wolters Kluwer N V  -0.013  0.000  0.992   
 (-4.192)  (  0.0468)     
This table presents (point) estimates of the adjustment vector in the VECM specified in (3) as well as the 
contribution of the Price Discovery in the VIX market (PDv) as specified in (5).  ** denote rejection of  
predominance of VIX leadership in the price discovery process  (PDx=0, PDv=1)at the 5% significance level on 
the basis of reported t statistics. In order for (PDx=0, PDv=1)to be accepted we require that α1 is significantly 
different from zero (at 5%) level while  α2 not being significantly different from zero.



































Fig 3:  VIX iTraxx and  France Telecom  COS 
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